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ABSTRACT
 This paper labors to expound the link between the socially mediated “trauma 
process,” or the creation of collective trauma through social discourse, and the proposed 
moniker of “crisis cinema” that has often been deployed by media scholars with no clear 
parameters. This paper, then, endeavors to evince the trauma process’ relevance to crises 
and disasters, explicitly define a paradigm by which crisis cinema can be understood, and 
subsequently utilized by a larger patronage, and showcase the pair’s reliance on one 
another. This is approached through the locus of the March 11, 2011 Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster and a selection of Japanese films that followed therein.
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PREFACE
 This project, an attempted cross disciplinary pursuit between film and media 
studies and trauma studies, is not meant to be an endpoint; the desire is for further 
scholarship to follow, by myself and others, whereby the enclosed arguments can be 
challenged, improved, and ultimately put to use as a cog in the discourses approached 
within. To substantiate this process of embetterment, further industry analysis and 
production study are required, especially given my role as non-Japanese looking in, and, 
therefore, offer a discernible path for the future of this work. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and ensuing tsunami shook 
Japan to its core, exposing the ill-preparedness of the country’s energy operators, notably 
at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, where a procession of grievous events 
engendered one of the greatest nuclear disasters of all time. The combined ruination of 
the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster directly claimed the lives of over 15,000 
people, with more than 2,600 disappearances reported across 6 prefectures (Abe, 9). The 
initial response to the disasters, recognized together as 3/11, was hampered by 
communication ineptitude and indecisiveness of the parties involved, namely Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan’s government and leading Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
officials (Kushida, 14). The nature of the disaster, along with the bungled recovery 
efforts, led to a diminution of public trust in nuclear safety, which was compounded by 
the government’s eventual insistence on resettling previously evacuated areas, despite the 
persisting danger to inhabitants (Suzuki, 13). TEPCO’s failure to effectively inform 
victims of the hazards presented, or not, by the disaster zones left many in “a complete 
state of anxiety about the future” (Onda, 71). As such, 3/11 is noted by scholars as being 
six-fold, extending beyond the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdowns, to also 
include a communications disaster, a breakdown of trust in authorities, and a widespread 
sense of social precarity (Fischer, 346). 
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The social precarity that followed 3/11, described in recent academia as a 
“condition of [having been] harmed in a specific way,” illustrates a state of enduring or 
surviving the damages of a crisis or disaster (Allbritton, 103). This state, enhanced by the 
perceived vulnerability to future disasters, represents “cultural trauma,” defined by 
scholars as “when people live in fear of imminent disaster and fears of future threat 
dominate consciousness” (Kaplan, 24). The cultural trauma of 3/11 is constituted by 
many forms of damage, such as damage to life and the decline in standard of living, all of 
which have changed over time (Yotsumoto, 266). These damages, being an “endless 
impact on life,” became pervasive elements of Japanese society, constantly reappearing 
in the lives of Japanese people across levels of affectedness (Caruth, 7). This proliferation 
aided in the construction of a national or collective trauma narrative and extended the 
pains of the disaster to all Japanese people by creating a “we” (Dinitto, 343). “We” 
represents the exhortation of solidarity in the face of mediated collective suffering, for 
example the phrase “Ganbarou Nippon,” (Let’s hang in there together, Japan) which 
could be found “on posters, social media, advertisements, bumper stickers, and 
handwritten missives of every kind” (Samuels, 40). Thus, Japan as a nation became a 
trauma culture, or “a culture in which discourses, and especially images, about 
catastrophic events proliferate,” as the entire nation was portrayed as the victim to 3/11 
(Kaplan, 24). 
Changes in audiences’ inclination and predilection require a measured reaction in 
film, a recurrent pattern throughout the continuance of Japanese cinema (Richie, 213). 
Thus, film’s capacity to deliver salvation from cultural trauma is due in part to its ability 
to “seek alternative narratives that might resonate with audiences,” especially when old 
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narratives no longer fit the bill. In 3/11’s case, Japan experienced national calls for 
change immediately following the disaster, which juxtaposed “the fallen present” with an 
idealized past, represented as “nostalgic Golden Ages,” or a utopian future free of the 
pains of modernity (Combs, 20). The answer to these calls, I will argue, came in the form 
of animated films that offered mediated recovery to 3/11’s trauma victims, whereby they 
could constructively engage with the demons that torment them, while simultaneously 
taking symbolic steps to overcoming them (Stahl, 164). Furthermore, I will provide 
evidence that this direct filmic engagement with trauma is representative of crisis cinema 
discourse, which will be defined definitively in relation to its international deployment. 
Thus, a cohesive paradigm of crisis cinema will be formed, which will be subsequently 
applied to the animated films in question. By doing so, the specific elements that have 
allowed these films to mediate cultural recovery in response to 3/11 will be revealed, 
establishing a new, undocumented pattern of crisis cinema.
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CHAPTER 2 
MARCH 11, 2011: AN OVERVIEW
Japan, an island nation resting near the meeting point of 4 tectonic plates, has had 
a seemingly interminable history with earthquakes, as 22 percent of the world’s 
magnitude (M) 6 or higher earthquakes transpire “in or near [it]” (Smits, 8). On March 
11, 2011, Japan was struck by an M9 megathrust – occurring in a subduction zone –  
earthquake that would later be accredited as the largest “known to have ever hit Japan” 
(Chock, 4). This earthquake, initially named the Tohoku Area Pacific Offshore 
Earthquake, was centered roughly 30 kilometers deep in an area just offshore the Sanriku 
coast in Northeastern Japan (Abe, 9). The event occurred “in an area often described as 
an ‘earthquake nest,’” which is known to have experienced a multitude of major 
earthquakes since at least 869 AD (Smits, 4). In 2007, it was estimated that the likelihood 
of an approximate M7.5 earthquake striking the area before 2037 was 99 percent, with 
the 2011 earthquake now being propounded as “represent[ing] a 1,000-year return period 
megathrust subduction earthquake” in reference to the 869 AD Jogan Sanriku Earthquake 
(Chock, 4). Despite the high frequency of earthquakes in the region, there remains no 
definitive method of predicting or forecasting their occurrence “in any socially useful 
way,” due to the lack of a “singular characteristic pattern of disaster” (Smits, 5). That 
notwithstanding, there were concerns from the scientific community regarding the 
possibility of a near-future, Jogan Sanriku-level seismic event, however, politicians and 
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power company officials disregarded, and in some cases suppressed, these voices of 
disquietude. These same politicians and officials would come to label the Tohoku Area 
Pacific Offshore Earthquake, and its aftermath, as “unimaginable,” in an attempt to 
palliate their incompetence (Smits, 22).  
 Megathrust earthquakes, also referred to as ocean trench earthquakes, make up 85 
percent of all earthquakes that “shake Japan,” and account for every seismic event higher 
than M8.0. These earthquakes “often generate trains of seismic sea waves,” which we call 
tsunami, an event that, before 2011, had occurred 5 times along the Sanriku coast since 
the year 1611 (Smits, 10). Just 3 minutes after the Tohoku Area Pacific Offshore 
Earthquake ruptured, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) issued a “severe tsunami 
warning” in response to the characteristics of the earthquake. The tsunami was detected 
by GPS buoys 10 to 20 kilometers offshore, where it was 100 to 400 meters deep, with 
wave amplitudes reaching 6.7 meters in some cases. Because of this, the anticipated near-
shore amplitude heights were expected to be “three times [higher]” (Chock, 4). In certain 
areas, such as the cities of Ofunato and Ishinomaki, the initial signs of the tsunami could 
be seen almost immediately after the earthquake due to subsidence, or the sudden, 
sometimes drastic sinking of the ground’s surface in response to an earthquake (Chock, 
6). After reaching its maximum propagation, the tsunami had ravaged the majority of the 
Sanriku coast, “in some cases wiping out areas thought to have been protected by 
seawalls” (Smits, 18). Together, along with all of the damage they caused, the earthquake 
and tsunami were named the “Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami,” and were 
directly responsible for 15,887 deaths and 2,656 disappearances as of July 2014. The 
large amount of disappearances is “an indication of the large number of tsunami victims,” 
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which is supported by the tsunami’s eventual 561 km² land coverage (Abe, 9). Beyond 
the loss of life, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami is believed to have caused 
an estimated 16.9 trillion yen – over $217 billion – in damages, due in part to the collapse 
of over 264,000 buildings (Chock, 4).  
 Among the devastation caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, 
the assault on the Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima-1) nuclear power plant (NPP) offered 
the most complexities (Smits, 2). Fukushima-1 is the oldest NPP owned and operated by 
the Tokyo Electric Power Company, (TEPCO) Japan’s foremost energy supplier, 
accounting for roughly one-third of national energy production. The plant was one of 
over 50 Japanese NPPs in operation on March 11, 2011 and was the most critically 
damaged out of the 5 NPPs struck by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami that 
day (Abe, 5). At the time of the disasters, 3 of the plant’s six reactors were in operation, 
with over 2,000 employees – 1,100 employed by TEPCO – present at the site (Abe, 8). 
When the M9.0 earthquake struck Fukushima-1, the operations center buildings “were 
catastrophically damaged, to the point of becoming unusable,” and the external power 
lines to the plant were severed, leaving only on-site channels of power (Kushida, 12). 
Much of the damage can be attributed to the plant’s design standards, which only 
required preparedness for an M6.5 earthquake. Thus, Fukushima-1 was subjected to 
acceleration from seismic land waves that “exceeded its maximum design basis…by 20 
percent” (Smits, 21). Approximately 40 minutes after the earthquake’s onset, the first 
tsunami wave struck the power plant’s 10-meter-high seawall. This seawall, built to stop 
tsunami waves of up to 5.7 meters, was obliterated by the second, much higher wave, 
which dealt its blow 8 minutes after the first. This second wave, measuring over 12 
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meters high, critically damaged the on-site power sources and cooling systems, hindering 
the plant’s ability to cool the reactors (Kushida, 12). With no means of cooling the 
reactors, the plant suffered 3 fuel core meltdowns, and subsequent hydrogen explosions, 
which released 168 times more radioactive cesium 137 than the atomic bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima (Kushida, 11). This process, the simultaneous critical damaging of 3 reactors, 
was a world first phenomenon that transformed the Fukushima-1 disaster into a “level 7 
major accident on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, (INES)” the 
same level as the 1986 Chernobyl accident (Abe, 2). Together, the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster became known as 
3/11, a disastrous date that was made worse by the misconduct of and mishandling by key 
figures, and which continues to cause complications to this day (Smits, 2). 
 Following the events of 3/11, specifically the nuclear disaster at Fukushima-1, 
politicians and TEPCO officials hastily dubbed the happenings as “unimaginable,” 
despite clear evidence that more could have been done to prevent such a catastrophe 
(Smits, 10). For example, Fukushima-1’s regulatory policy “dates from 1978,” and the 
countermeasures implemented for earthquakes and tsunamis only prepared the NPP for 
an event similar to the “previous largest earthquake that has occurred since the Meiji 
period,” (1868-1912) which is considered a “terribly short time geologically” by experts 
(Smits, 20). Along with these severe gaps in preparedness, the initial response to the 
disaster by Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s government and TEPCO officials reeked of 
inefficiency that stymied the supposition of swift containment and recovery (Kushida, 
13). At the time of an emergency, just as with normal operation, the Fukushima-1 plant is 
the responsibility of its operator, TEPCO (Abe, 8). Despite this, TEPCO’s chairman and 
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president were absent for 17 hours following the earthquake and tsunami, engendering a 
leadership vacuum at the energy company’s headquarters that plagued communication 
attempts with the government and on-site operators. Additionally, the prime minister’s 
office was in a veritable state of chaos, with emergency headquarters being set up in a 
room that “had only one phone line, and initially no computer, fax, or information such as 
schematics of the Fukushima nuclear plant” (Kushida, 14). Without sufficient 
communication between the parties involved, steps towards recovery were greatly 
impeded, with the plant manager at Fukushima-1, Masao Yoshida, needing to disregard 
orders, or lack thereof, in order to deal with the threat (Kushida, 14). This manifested 
when the need to inject seawater into the reactors emerged, as plant manager Yoshida 
began injecting seawater to stave off meltdown an hour before the political leadership 
gave the go ahead. Upon finding this out, a TEPCO liaison to the government ordered 
Yoshida to “halt the seawater injections until formal government order was issued,” as 
seawater could render the reactors inoperable (Kushida, 18). TEPCO’s self-serving 
behavior did not end there, with Kan’s government receiving numerous contact attempts 
from TEPCO officials that inquired into the possibility of abandoning Fukushima-1 mid-
disaster. Prime Minister Kan, who believed this to be an attempt to shift all culpability 
onto his government, ignored the requests and met with plant manager Yoshida directly. 
Unlike his superiors, Yoshida reassured the prime minister that key operators “would die 
with him defending the plant” (Kushida, 20). 
The devastation of 3/11 has persisted in many ways, with one of the most 
substantial sources of remembrance being the land it claimed. While most earthquake and 
tsunami impacted lands have been restored, there is a sizable area of land that remains 
 
9 
tainted by the evocation of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, which forced over 
100,000 people from their homes (Abe, 2). Following evacuation, the land surrounding 
the NPP was categorized into 3 types based on the ability for inhabitance; non-return, 
preparation for return, and possible to return, with each demarcation shifting – seemingly 
haphazardly – over time (Suzuki, 12). As for the Fukushima-1 plant itself,  the process of 
decommissioning is expected to take upwards of 40 years and will pose “significant risk 
to workers and the public” (Suzuki, 10). To achieve this end, TEPCO founded the 
Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decommissioning Engineering Company, 
which is following a specific process for decommissioning and decontaminating the 
plant. First, the spent fuel is being removed from all 4 units. Next, the melted core debris 
will be removed from units 1-3. Finally, overall decontamination of the plant will occur 
(Suzuki, 11). There is a fair amount of skepticism regarding TEPCO’s plans, with critics 
citing both the lack of research in fields required to complete this process and TEPCO’s 
first major endeavor, a subterranean “frozen wall” meant to “stop water flowing in and 
out of the site.” The wall has, thus far, proven to be effectively limited (Suzuki, 11). 
Distrust in TEPCO has stemmed from other events as well, such as their attempted 
dumping of likely-contaminated water into the ocean, public inaccessibility to debates 
surrounding future nuclear energy goals, and exponential changes to the cost of 
decommissioning and decontaminating the Fukushima-1 NPP (Suzuki, 15). 
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CHAPTER 3 
NARRATIVES AND NATIONALISM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PURSUIT
Catastrophic events, such as war and natural disasters, possess the innate ability to 
impel expansive social, political, and economic change, thereby upsetting the status quo 
and completely redefining “normal.” This is an effect that can unconditionally reshape a 
generation, such as Japan’s “greatest generation” of rebuilders following WWII, who 
were bound together by the shared experience of wartime devastation (Samuels, 
25).When a large collective is, as a whole, subjected to the brutality of a monstrous 
calamity, the event itself becomes a tool by which “groups battle to define the situation 
and so to control it.” Thus, crises become socially constructed and manipulated 
battlefields, upon which warring narratives compete to deliver lessons to those that must 
carry on (Samuels, 27). This was indeed the case for Japan’s 3/11, where contesting 
narratives invaded the public sphere and dominated discourses surrounding 4 specific 
motifs. For the first 3 themes, leadership, risk, and community, the winning narratives 
became readily apparent early on, forcing their way into acceptance through “right by 
majority.” On leadership, the majority – roughly 70 percent – deemed the leadership 
during 3/11 to be “the single greatest impediment to an effective response.” Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan was the maximal target of this public ire, with his premiership 
ending just 6 months after the disaster, following a downturn in public approval that was 
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united by a compelling consensus: “he has no leadership capability” (Samuels, 34). As 
for risk, TEPCO’s aforementioned exploits rendered it as the “consensus villain with 
regard to risk and vulnerability.” Japan’s fragility became a keystone of the ensuing 
narrative, especially in regard to nuclear safety, and TEPCO’s role as malefactor was 
cemented by its inability to read the room. Indeed, less than a month after the disaster, 
TEPCO submitted plans to add two more reactors to the Fukushima-1 NPP (Samuels, 
38). Finally, with respect to community, the winning narrative defined the people of 
Tohoku as the embodiment of Japan, extending the suffering that resulted from 3/11 to 
the entire nation, represented by “a community connected by bonds and human contact 
that sustains solidarity through common struggle.” (Samuels, 40). These narratives, 
surrounding leadership, risk, and community, are direct responses to the damages caused 
by 3/11, many of which have been categorized and analyzed using models developed 
following previous crises in Japan (Yotsumoto, 255). 
The damages experienced by Japanese citizens following 3/11 constitute the 
collective despondency that became an indispensable element of the most pervasive and 
widely accepted narratives in response to the disaster. Recent scholarship has defined – 
and subsequently investigated – the damages with respect to Fukushima Prefecture, 
which is argued as having suffered the most damage due to the Fukushima-1 nuclear 
accident (Onda, 80). Herein, these damages will be analyzed through the purview of 
national ubiquity – specifically the damage to life, psychological damage, and damage to 
community – which will capacitate more profound discussion on Japan’s crisis narratives 
as prepotent. Perhaps the most severe damage to result from 3/11, the damage to life 
denotes the deaths that derived from any degree of the disaster – earthquake, tsunami, or 
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the ensuing chaos in evacuation zones (Yotsumoto, 256). As such, the damage to life 
became a keystone of all resulting narratives, with “disaster-related” deaths explicitly 
exemplifying the role that humans played in 3/11’s devastation – disaster-related deaths 
refer to deaths “[not] caused directly by an earthquake or tsunami but by a later indirect 
event,” of which there were over 3000 (Abe, 4). A principal cause of these disaster-
related deaths was the inefficiency of evacuation plans, which, among other outcomes, 
saw hundreds of people go without the medical treatment they needed, something that 
was not lost on the national collective following the disaster. It, therefore, took form as a 
segment of the leadership motif ultimately forged by the inability to effectively respond 
to the disasters (Yotsumoto, 256). Furthermore, the “inherent vulnerability of modern 
civilization” played a pivotal role in the risk motif, engendering a sense of precarity in all 
Japanese citizens that envisioned a yet-to-happen sequel to the disaster (Samuels, 35). 
This manifested in areas such as the large increase in suicides following 3/11, spurred on 
by the anticipation of future calamities, and is symbolic of the psychological burdens that 
result from “all dimensions of damage” (Yotsumoto, 262). Moreover, these damages – 
damage to life and psychological damage – strengthened the perceived damage to 
community, which – as its name suggests – was paramount to the community motif 
(Samuels, 39). Compounded by the shallowness of local identities, the damage to 
community naturally resulted in greater emphasis on national recovery efforts (Samuels, 
40). Those “most” damaged by the disasters played a role in this, as the reliance on 
outside help created a scission in local communities and created bonds that transcended 
local municipalities (Onda, 80). The culmination of these damages – and the constructed, 
widely accepted narratives that followed – gave rise to the fourth and “principal” motif of 
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3/11, a final series of narratives that, supported by their own discourses, offer the solution 
to the suffering of Japan; change (Samuels, 32). 
In the immediate aftermath of 3/11, calls for “wholesale change” began to 
dominate discourses all around Japan, with the disaster being coined a “hinge of history” 
that would revive the declining nation (Samuels, 31). Three master narratives developed 
from this change motif, each offering their own vision for the future of the nation. The 
first change narrative, dubbed “staying the course,” expresses concerns with the dangers 
posed by expedient, blanketed changes, and expostulates the degree of the disaster, 
contending that has been overblown (Samuels, 26). Proponents of this narrative, mainly 
stakeholders in the energy sector and national security, claim that sweeping change could 
“increase energy costs, destroy jobs, slow growth, result in power shortages, pollute the 
environment, and result in higher taxes” (Samuels, 32). In this way, “staying the course” 
represents the resistance to change, promising a brighter future if nuclear energy is 
pursued unremittingly (Samuels, 26). The second narrative centered on change following 
3/11, slated as “reversing the course,” focuses on the “failure of modernity,” and 
advocates for a “return to coexistence with nature” that rejects materialism and wasteful 
consumption. Arguments in favor of this narrative come from those with roots in historic 
nationalist movements in Japan, religious sects, environmental activists, and more 
(Samuels, 32). “Reversing the course,” then, represents the need to “undo the structures 
and assumptions about progress that led to the catastrophe,” fundamentally altering 
modern Japanese society in pursuit of simplification and, therefore, a future forged by 
infallible practices (Samuels, 26). The final change narrative, labeled “putting it in gear,” 
refers to the need to accelerate away from 3/11 – and the things that caused it – in an 
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attempt to look for “a newer, better, safer place” (Samuels, 26). Support for this narrative 
comes from many directions but is united by the hope that 3/11 will be the spark needed 
to “generate a new nation” that would reach utopia through innovation (Samuels, 31). 
Notwithstanding the major ideological differences that constituted the disaster discourse, 
one thing became abundantly clear; the “deep yearning for change” that was vocalized all 
over Japan proved that the nation was – once again – experiencing a national identity 
crisis (Samuels, 30). 
The pains of modernity have often provoked the nationalist voices of Japan, 
specifically those that articulate the need to reevaluate Japanese identity following critical 
milestones (Iida, 4). Japanese nationalism is seen as a non-ending process, or at least not 
having ended yet, by which a “variety of projects, policies, and actions” are linked 
together under competing discourses of “national interest,” which do battle in the public 
domain and involve “a wide range of agents” (Wilson, 3). Three times in its past, Japan 
has experienced “openings” to the outside world, each resulting in a national identity 
crisis that impacted the trajectory of nationalist discourse. The first, during the Meiji 
restoration, saw the newly reestablished imperial rule scramble to adopt “advanced 
Western technologies” that would aid their imperialistic pursuit (Tezuka, 9). This first 
opening became the spark that would ignite nationalism in Japan – a concept that, for 
“ordinary people,” was “unfamiliar and perhaps unattractive” – with the first iteration 
being a “top-down creation” featuring a “passive populace manipulated from above” 
(Wilson, 4). “By the end of the Meiji period,” though, nationalism had become an 
“established fact” whereby the Japanese lived, resolving the identity crisis engendered by 
the pressure of Western imperialism (Wilson, 8). Japan’s second opening, defeat in 
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World War II, is often blamed on the militaristic pursuits that followed the first opening, 
and as such a blanketed problematization of national – or imperialistic – imagery was 
practiced, relegating the signs of Japan’s first wave of nationalism to “tainted symbols of 
dubious credibility” (Befu, 100). Japan was consequently left with a “symbolic vacuum,” 
or “absence of any alternative worldview, cultural model, or ideology,” which, as a 
national identity crisis, enabled the rise of Japanese essentialism through discourses such 
as Nihonjinron (Befu, 102). Nihonjinron – a cultural discourse comprised of the search 
for the “essence of being Japanese” – is representative of secondary cultural nationalism, 
or the interest in “distinctive Japanese patterns of behavior and thought compared to 
those of non-Japanese,” which became the foremost source of nationalism after the war 
(Yoshino, 50).  
Japan’s third opening, neo-liberal economic globalization in the 1980s, is 
heralded as “a period of transition from the unique to the universal,” a direct slight to the 
essentialist school of thought that dominated previous decades. This led to the prevalence 
of cosmopolitanism, whereby different types of people “habitually cross national and 
cultural borders physically or virtually, developing a sense of multiple belongings to 
accommodate contradictions and rival ways of living within their own lifestyles,” and 
challenged cultural nationalism from its foundation up (Tezuka, 12). The resulting 
identity crisis, however, found its roots in the “acute quest for meaning in response to the 
seemingly endless flood of commercial signs that [had] permeated and suffused the 
realms of subjectivity and social imaginary with notions of fragmentation, 
disembodiment, and ambiguity” (Iida, 8). Thus, Japan’s openings – and, importantly, 
their ensuing national identity crises – can be delineated as a process that has 
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superintended the birth of nationalism to benefit the state, precipitated the early 
development and growing pains of cultural nationalism through the problematization of 
national history, and legitimized a rebellious flirt with cosmopolitanization, fueled by 
postmodern angst. By applying the features of an effective narrative to the 
aforementioned change motif that followed 3/11, I argue that the disaster was Japan’s 
“fourth opening,” which resulted in a new national identity crisis that amended to this 
“never ending” process of Japanese nationalism by offering maturation of the discourse 
and salvation through the redefining of cultural national identity. 
 An effective narrative is “marked by several features” that allow it to become a 
crucial element of “the process of interpretation” by “pick[ing] and pack[ing] the facts to 
achieve a desired end” (Samuels, 28). This is true for the popular narratives in favor of 
change following 3/11, both “reversing the course” and “putting it in gear,” which I will 
argue constitute a larger, less exclusive narrative, labeled here as “changing the course,” 
whose “desired end” is to redefine Japan’s national identity. “Changing the course,” then, 
is in direct contention with “staying the course,” or the voices against change following 
3/11, which, along with the unsurety of what change to enact, created a national identity 
crisis that problematizes Japan’s current course of reliance on nuclear energy. Thus, 
change, at the national level, was posited as the solution to the collective suffering caused 
by 3/11, as only widespread change would cure the “stagnant nation” and deliver 
salvation from the precarious pursuit of perceptible self-destruction (Samuels, 30). This 
relied heavily upon the effective narrative features mentioned above, which, as a whole, 
allowed nationalist ideology to invade the popular domain at the behest of convalescence 
by solidarity. 
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The first feature of an effective narrative that “changing the course” exhibits, 
regardless of the proposed direction of change, is its moral appeal. As discussed 
previously, blame was assigned by the mobilized majority following the disaster, 
enabling the contriving of a “good” – those that suffered the damages of 3/11 and those 
who helped – as well as a bad – those responsible for the anthropogenic escalation of 
ruination. TEPCO and the government, particularly Prime Minister Naoto Kan, were the 
whipping boys of this narrative, as they were seen to have caused the most harm, 
ensuring that, when it came, change would begin with them (Samuels, 27). The second 
effective narrative feature that “changing the course” evinces is the existence of ideas and 
language that “resonates with larger cultural themes,” by which change could be 
extended to save all of Japan (Samuels, 27). This transpires by way of the “trauma 
process,” or the “socially mediated construction of trauma,” that “constructs a ‘we,’” 
thereby elevating 3/11 to the level of “national trauma” when victimization is expounded 
as a national tragedy (Dinitto, 342).  As a national trauma narrative, then, the return of 
arguments such as Japanese people’s innate ability to “endure hardship, as they have in 
the past, and survive the vicissitudes of life on their volcanic islands” is made possible, 
and the reliance on national solidarity becomes requisite (Dinitto, 343). The third feature 
showcased by “changing the course” is its ability to “stick,” thus ensuring that its ideas 
disseminate through Japanese culture, overcoming competing narratives and finding 
support at a national level (Samuels, 27). This relies on the repetitive nature of trauma, 
defined here as “a wound inflicted not upon the body but upon the mind” that “addresses 
us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available” (Caruth, 4). 
Trauma’s address – as a result of having survived an “encounter with death” – “repeats 
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itself, exactly and unremittingly, through the unknowing acts of the survivor and against 
his very will,” propagating the nationalist ideas that indict the present course for Japan’s 
suffering and framing change as a necessity hereafter (Caruth, 7).  
The final effective narrative feature that “changing the course” exhibits is the 
credibility of the deliverer, which has relied extensively upon mediation to “organize 
reality” (Samuels, 29). According to Anne Friedberg’s The Virtual Window, interaction 
with a screen – a framing of reality – enables the subject to represent reality back to 
themselves (Friedberg, 342). The mediated framing of reality following 3/11 adheres to 
this, as it “portray[ed] something as problematic, [found] causes for that problem, 
introduce[d] a moral element, and suggest[ed] solutions,” all of which depends on the 
“core values and priorities of the public” (Samuels, 29). The construction of a national 
trauma narrative – a moral element –framed the disaster as problematic and defined the 
causes as the “bad” that perpetrated the accident, allowing the suggestion of a solution in 
the form of change, which would carry the nation away from the problematic present. 
This solution engages with cultural – and therefore national – themes that would resonate 
with trauma victims – expanded to all of Japan as discussed previously– and thereby 
revitalizes nationalist discourse. In order to accomplish this, semiotically potent artwork 
is needed to fulfill the “ethical imperative to create witnesses to disaster” that would 
breathe life into discourses derived from nationalist ideology (Kaplan, 23). The 
subsequent witnessing involves “taking responsibility for injustices in the past and 
preventing future human-based catastrophe,” which is required by “not just the individual 
but the social collectivity as well,” and would act as a call to action that demands change 
(Kaplan, 24). As with Japan’s previous three openings, and resulting national identity 
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crises, the events of 3/11 have been extensively engaged in cinematic productions, which 
have worked to deliver the “desired ends” of their respective nationalist discourses, 
“changing the course” included (Richie, 217). In fact, there exists an entire, albeit loosely 
defined and understood, subset of cinema dedicated to the mediation of crises and their 
cultural impact, or so media scholars have declared.
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CHAPTER 4 
AN EXPLORATION OF CRISIS CINEMA DISCOURSE
Cinema, that ever-dying, most crisis-stricken medium, has quite ironically – or 
not – been a favored means of mediating those wrinkles in the human condition that we 
label crises. Whether it has been to create a collective that shares the load of social and 
political burdens, fantasize a battle with the hegemonic institutions of malaise, or call to 
action the guards of tradition, many film industries around the world have produced films 
that engage with the historical, political, or geographic crises that shake them. Media 
scholars have continuously deployed the term “crisis cinema” to categorize these films 
regardless of differences, which has allowed a veil of ambiguity to envelop the moniker, 
obfuscating the scope of its applicability. Because of this, it is important to define “crisis 
cinema” in respect to the dissimilitude allotted when approaching new scholarship on the 
subject, especially given the number of cinemas that have contributed to this 
phenomenon. From Spanish crisis cinema’s focus on physical vulnerability resulting 
from financial instability to Hong Kong crisis cinema’s heroics that are defined by the 
blending of Chinese tradition and Western values, each subset of crisis cinema offers 
distinct attributes and characteristics that must be perceived in their national or cultural 
contexts, and therefore the milieu of the crises that spawned them. 
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 The differences present in the various incarnations of crisis cinema 
notwithstanding, there are significant elements that have maintained their consistency 
across geographic and political boundaries. Most seminally, the conception of a suffering 
protagonist is seen across the board in crisis cinema discourse, with a specific focus on 
past and/or yet to happen damages that are an apodictic analog to the pains associated 
with the crisis in reality. This component is key to developing a pattern of crisis cinema, 
as the other defining elements are derived from the trauma of main characters. For 
example, the creation of a group or collective that surrounds the anguishing protagonist, 
the next most common element in crisis cinema discourse, enables the apportion of pain, 
constituting a collective of suffering that struggles in solidarity. This cooperative of 
dolor’s parallel to the real-world victims of crisis is axiomatic and represents the 
establishment of a single unifying identity that allows association and identification 
across levels of affectedness. Next, crisis cinema’s films commonly formulate a fracas 
with an oppressive force that is deemed responsible for the ailment of society – 
represented through the aforementioned collective of suffering and the hegemonic disdain 
of authoritative figures. This clash is paradigmatic of the indignation of those that suffer 
from real-world crises, and is aimed at the powers that be, who are perceived as either 
having failed to protect the victims or are directly responsible for their detriment. Finally, 
films in crisis cinema discourse often posit tradition as the salvation sought by those who 
suffer, which sets the stage for conflict with the draconian bloc of dominion that 
repudiates the bygone. This betokens crisis victims’ desire to create a future that echoes 
the characteristics of a time before their torment and indicates a mistrust in the future 
forged by perceived vulnerability. I argue that, together, these four elements – the 
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suffering protagonist, a constructed collective that shares the burdens of crises, necessary 
conflict with antagonistic or incompetent authorities, and the salvific capacity of tradition 
required to build a safer future – are the defining parameters of crisis cinema discourse as 
employed internationally by media scholars. Herein, select films will be analyzed from 
commonly studied crisis cinema campaigns – resulting from both political, economic, or 
social plights, as well as from natural or anthropogenic disasters – to develop a paradigm 
by which current and future crisis cinema discourses may be more clearly defined. 
 Spain has become a prominent locus for crisis cinema discourse, in both 
production and research, as a multitude of films have engaged with the economic crisis 
that afflicted the country less than a decade ago. Recent scholarship covering these films, 
such as Dean Allbritton’s Prime Risks: The Politics of Pain and Suffering in Spanish 
Crisis Cinema, has focused on the ways in which the very political structures and 
measures in place for the safeguarding of Spain’s populace have begun to cause the most 
harm. Allbritton argues that “the democratic processes that govern many modern states” 
expose citizens to themselves and the law alike, and that this exposure can cause harm to 
their physical bodies (Allbritton, 101). This physical vulnerability, he continues, has 
linked with the deteriorating socioeconomic condition to present a “spiraling system of 
increasing physical peril,” fueled by the mediation of the crisis through film (Allbritton, 
102). In this way, physical vulnerability stemming from pecuniary plights is argued as 
being the driving force for this wave of crisis cinema, and results in a sense of precarity 
that, as a way of being, acts upon the citizens involved, calling them to action. The 
relationship between vulnerability and precarity is further defined, “vulnerability is the 
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ability to be harmed, and precarity is the condition of being harmed,” and represents a 
central element in Spain’s crisis cinema discourse (Allbritton, 103). 
 The scope of films that constitute Spanish crisis cinema defined in Allbritton’s 
research, and therefore this paper, is demarcated as “Spanish films that engage or 
confront what it means to live in a crisis,” which he argues as allowing for the 
applicability to any crisis that Spain encounters (Allbritton, 103). Notwithstanding the 
variation that can be expected in films that fall into this loose category, the 
aforementioned parameters of our crisis cinema paradigm are present in each film, which 
helps to substantiate the pattern. In Spanish crisis cinema’s case, as argued by Allbritton, 
the relationship between physical vulnerability and ensuing precarity is the essence from 
which the other elements are derived, making it key to start at the source of distress. This, 
he claims, is the vulnerable protagonist – often represented through occupational or 
political plights that impact financial security – whose vulnerability leads to physical 
damage, and therefore a state of precarity, that engenders suffering (Allbritton, 105). 
Thus, we have the suffering protagonist prescribed for our explicated pattern of crisis 
cinema, expounded by both economic vulnerability and physical precarity. Next, 
Allbritton states that the films in Spain’s crisis cinema “attempt to organize the individual 
experience of precarity and vulnerability into a communal one,” enabling their interplay 
to invent a collective of suffering (Allbritton, 103). This fulfills the necessitation that our 
crisis cinema paradigm depends on the concoction of a collective around those that 
suffer. Furthermore, Allbritton argues that this collective condemns the – oft-antagonistic 
– hegemonic institutions they serve, deeming them responsible for their original state of 
vulnerability, further confirming our criteria as the inevitable dissension occurs 
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(Allbritton, 105). Finally, those that suffer in Allbritton’s analysis are said to look to the 
halcyon past to quell the anguish caused by the uncertain future, which, once again, 
adheres to our crisis cinema paradigm (Allbritton, 105).  
 Alex de la Iglesia’s La chipsa de la vida (As Luck Would Have It), 2011, exhibits 
all 4 components of our proposed paradigm of crisis cinema, while staying true to key 
elements of Spanish crisis cinema following the “Great Spanish Depression.” Set in 
contemporary Spain, the story focuses on Roberto Gomez as he deals with prolonged 
unemployment, which causes him to struggle with the thought of having failed his 
family. After being turned down at a job interview with former colleagues, Roberto 
decides to visit the hotel where he and his wife spent their honeymoon, which he 
discovers no longer exists, having been replaced by a museum. Roberto begins to wander 
around the place, resulting in his being chased by Claudio, a security guard patrolling the 
grounds. This ends as Roberto enters a restricted area, an archeological dig site, and falls 
a great height, impaling his skull on a metal rod. Thus, Roberto’s financial instability – 
vulnerability – has led to his being physically harmed – precarity – through a series of 
events that is emblematic of Spain’s crisis cinema following the 2008 financial crisis. 
This, therefore, creates our requisite suffering protagonist, as the post-unemployment 
depression and subsequent mortal wound weigh down on Roberto’s very existence.  
While waiting for paramedics to arrive, Roberto calls his wife to deliver the news, 
however, she is unable to understand everything being said and rushes to his side. At 
around the same time, a tour group, led by the mayor and museum director, enter the area 
where the accident has occurred. Both of these events, his wife coming to join him and 
the tour group erupting onto the scene, represent the creation of a collective surrounding 
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the suffering protagonist that we necessitate. Nevertheless, as the events continue and 
more people are involved – the paramedics cannot move him for fear of killing him, so 
they wait on doctors to arrive, journalists are contacted to get the “scoop,” museum 
employees try various ways to end the spectacle – underlying intentions and motives are 
revealed. The mayor is portrayed as one of the greatest malefactors, as he just wants the 
situation resolved quickly and quietly, regardless of whether or not Roberto survives. 
Along with this, journalists and reporters begin to invade the scene, further impeding the 
medical professionals’ work, in an attempt to get exclusive footage to sell for a profit. 
These actions are symbolic of the malaise caused by authoritative figures that is key to 
our crisis cinema paradigm, and directly interfere with the struggling collective, thereby 
causing conflict. Finally, envisioning his family’s return to a time before their financial 
struggle, Roberto plots with a journalist to sell an exclusive interview that damns the 
institutions that led to his plight, and in doing so, uses them to free his family from the 
fallen present – a clear parallel to the reverence of the past when looking to the future that 
helps to constitute our crisis cinema paradigm. In this way, Roberto’s actions cast 
“optimism, hope, and sympathy as stand-ins for any action that might effect a real change 
upon the world” (Allbritton, 112). 
 Hong Kong’s film industry is another that has birthed a Brobdingnagian body of 
films in reaction to a contemporary crisis, and similarly to Spain, media scholars have 
sought to apply the moniker of crisis cinema to them. The crisis that Hong Kong faced, 
however, offered disparate challenges, as described in Tony Williams’ Space, Place, and 
Spectacle: The Crisis Cinema of John Woo. Scholarship such as this has focused on the 
identity crisis that ailed Hong Kong regarding the 1997 handover to mainland China, with 
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this article specifically focusing on the work of John Woo as director. Williams claims 
most Hong Kong residents “view[ed] 1997 as an apocalyptic ‘end of the world,’” an 
element that crops up repeatedly in Woo’s work (Williams, 70). It is also averred that 
Woo explicitly approaches the handover by focusing on “’things’ [he] feels are in danger 
of ‘being lost,’” and “contesting identifications, rooted within past and contemporary 
Chinese traditions, as well as current Western values,” which he uses to problematize the 
present and elevate the past (Williams, 71). A “better tomorrow” is rendered through the 
miasma of a “gloomily envisaged historical and cultural apocalypse” with the pursuit of 
the bygone, thereby relieving society of the agony caused by the immediate (Williams, 
79). 
 Crisis is explicated in Williams’ paper as “a contemporary situation that expresses 
a lack of confidence, despair, artistic uncertainty, a lack of faith in progress, and a 
deficiency of old ‘master narratives’ securities,” and is applied to John Woo’s works 
from 1986 to 1992 (Williams, 69). Despite the dissimilitude that may exist within this 
gamut, just as with Spain, the constants of our crisis cinema paradigm remain veracious. 
The previously accounted for “things in danger of being lost” is a salient foundation, as 
Woo’s work “involves parallels between vanishing traditions confronting pressing 
realities of the modern world and a colony in danger of losing its very identity,” which 
provide the means whereby our requisite elements materialize (Williams, 73). First, the 
protagonists of Woo’s films habitually face “violent embodiments of different forms of 
twentieth-century societies of spectacle,” which engender extensive anguish and misery 
(Williams, 79). This exemplifies the suffering protagonist criterion that our crisis cinema 
model mandates. Compounding this, Woo uses space in his films as an allegory for Hong 
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Kong’s identity, allowing disruptions in filmic space to represent disruptions in Hong 
Kong society (Williams, 75). Thus, any friction faced by lead characters becomes a 
hurdle for Hong Kong as a whole, which extends the affliction to those surrounding the 
protagonists and creates a collective that shares Hong Kong’s suffering. Furthermore, 
Woo’s work commonly employs legitimization crises to substantiate the “pressing 
realities of the modern world,” which cause the collective of suffering to erupt into a 
brouhaha trained at their experienced unfair treatment by the officialdom (Williams, 73). 
This is symbolic of the proposed conflict with inimical institutions of power that is 
obligatory to our crisis cinema paradigm. Lastly, the films described in Williams’ paper 
mediate the overcoming of obstacles through “visions of China’s heroic past,” positing 
tradition as the solution to the fallen present, offering a prosperous future through 
adherence to cultural history, as our argument goes (Williams, 79).  
 John Woo’s Hard Boiled, 1992, is a prime exemplar of not only Hong Kong crisis 
cinema – containing elements such as doubling and the blending of Eastern motifs and 
Western values – but also of our proposed pattern that defines crisis cinema. Set in Hong 
Kong during the lead up to the handover, the film follows “Tequila,” a gun-slinging 
police inspector bent on revenge, and Alan, an undercover cop that has infiltrated a triad 
syndicate. Both characters are symbolic of a suffering protagonist, as Tequila’s partner is 
killed in a shootout that subsequently leads to Tequila being taken off the case, and 
Alan’s role as undercover agent sees him committing atrocities that pain him to his core. 
The actions of the two constantly converge throughout the course of the film, which 
manifests the element of doubling common to Hong Kong crisis cinema from this period, 
acting as an allegory for the split nature of Hong Kong’s existence – British colony and 
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Chinese special administrative region. Eventually, Tequila and Alan team up to stop the 
nefarious plans of a triad boss, Johnny, which leads them to a calamitous showdown at a 
populated hospital. Both the bonding of Tequila and Alan and the endangerment of the 
hospital’s staff and patients represent the creation of collectives to share the suffering of 
the individual. Tequila and Alan, who were laboriously chasing the same eventual 
outcome, are able to rely on each other to reach that desired end. Their fight extends to 
the innocent people in the hospital, who must hope for the protagonists’ deed to be 
completed for fear of personal harm – thus, our suffering protagonists are the 
embodiment of heroics meant to deliver Hong Kong from ruination. 
 The antagonistic authority criterion that our paradigm promises is represented 
through different characters or groups in the film. First, police superintendent Pang – in 
charge of both Tequila and Alan – blocks Tequila’s pursuit of vengeance for his slain 
partner and commands Alan to continue his undercover role even when he is 
uncomfortable doing so. This, however, is overcame and overshadowed by the greater 
hegemonic threat, which takes form in Johnny and his goons gaining control of the 
hospital, and, therefore, control of the lives of the collective – allegorically threatening 
Hong Kong. Thus, the clash that ensues is representative of the collective’s confrontation 
with the domineering powers that be, which supports our model. Finally, the communal 
salvation comes in the form of the knight-errant-esque heroics of Tequila, who 
“unconsciously performs an action ascribed to an earlier hero, Chao Yun,” thereby saving 
the day – and the future – with Chinese tradition and confirming our crisis cinema 
paradigm (Williams, 79). 
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 Japan is no stranger to crises or the subsequent mediation that responds to them, 
having experienced its fair share of both over the lifetime of the Japanese film industry. 
Just as with the other instances discussed previously, media scholars have habitually 
applied the crisis cinema label to Japanese films that are argued as being unequivocal 
reactions to the crises that have rocked the nation. This is exemplified in Yoshiko Ikeda’s 
article, Godzilla and the Japanese after World War II: From a Scapegoat of the 
Americans to a savior of the Japanese, where the Godzilla franchise is analyzed through 
the scope of crisis cinema discourse. Ikeda’s work posits the series’ foundation as a 
cinematic response to the devastation caused by World War II, claiming “[Godzilla’s] 
destruction is closely related to Japan’s experiences in World War II” and “symbolically 
re-enact[s] a problematic United States-Japan relationship that includes atomic war, 
occupation, and thermo-nuclear tests” (Ikeda, 44). Her argument continues, “Godzilla 
formulas have proved to be very adaptable in confronting underlying themes and 
anxieties in the Japanese cultural psyche,” which manifested as “a horrible monster and 
destroyed big cities in Japan” (Ikeda, 61). 
 Similar to what we have seen with Spain and Hong Kong, Japan’s crisis cinema – 
represented here as the Godzilla franchise – helps to explicate our proposed crisis cinema 
paradigm. The elements that do this are a result of the film series’ ability to “project the 
fears and struggles of the Japanese against the Americans, the Japanese themselves, 
science and technology, civilization, and later politics and economy” (Ikeda, 61). The 
suffering protagonist pattern is usually found in the individual or group of individuals 
that are trying to stop Godzilla’s destruction, but that also “understand him as a warning 
of the danger of nuclear weapons and war” (Ikeda, 56). The suffering, then, is created by 
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not only Godzilla’s wrath, but by the knowledge that humanity is ultimately responsible 
for the devastation. Additionally, the films showcase “Godzilla’s destruction of the city 
from the viewpoint of the attacked crowds,” extending the pain to any unfortunate soul 
found in the monster’s wake (Ikeda, 47). This creates a collective of suffering that 
represents the “human cost of Godzilla, the H-bombs that have produced him, and 
ultimately World War II itself,” and which affirms out crisis cinema paradigm (Ikeda, 
48). Because of this, conflict in the films is generated with both Godzilla and those that 
would perpetrate further nuclear disaster, or “the statesmen who misuse” nuclear bombs, 
alike (Ikeda, 48). The solution to the ruination, therefore, is recognizing that “society 
cannot save itself only with the power of science and technology,” with the need to have 
“a strong sense of morality and responsibility” to alleviate the “danger of nuclear 
weapons and the devastating consequences of war” being paramount (Ikeda, 50). Thus, 
the “fear and distrust of science,” along with the destruction they have caused, manifests 
the desire to create a future free from their eidolon, often symbolically linked to the 
experiences prior their conception (Ikeda, 50). 
 Ishiro Honda’s 1954 film, Gojira, formulated many of the components and 
patterns that would remain consistent across the Godzilla franchise to this day. Set in 
post-war Japan, the film follows Emiko Yamane, daughter of paleontologist Kyohei 
Yamane, and those that she interacts with through the course of Godzilla’s rampage, 
including her father’s colleague, Dr. Daisuke Serizawa, and the man she loves, salvage 
ship captain Hideto Ogata. Each of these characters exemplify a suffering protagonist, 
with their individual pains corresponding with key moments of the film. For example, 
Emiko is arranged to marry Dr. Serizawa, however, before she can inform him of her 
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decision to cancel the marriage to pursue her love for Ogata, she witnesses Serizawa’s 
creation, the oxygen destroyer. The device, which eliminates oxygen from a fish tank, 
thereby killing the fish, terrifies Emiko, causing her to run away after promising to keep 
it a secret. Later in the film, she must depend on Serizawa’s device and help him 
overcome his unwillingness to use it – representative of Serizawa’s suffering – resulting 
in her breaking the promise and divulging his secret to Ogata.  
Emiko and Ogata confront Serizawa, arguing – a literal brawl happens when 
Ogata tries to get to Serizawa’s research – that the device is needed to put an end to 
Godzilla’s desolation. A collective, then, forms when they convince Serizawa to – along 
with Dr. Yamane, who did not want Godzilla killed – deploy the oxygen destroyer to 
save Japan. All the while, Japanese citizens constitute another collective that is suffering, 
delineated by the monster’s ruination, and further representative of our crisis cinema 
model. The titular character of the film, Godzilla, represents the antagonistic power that 
recklessly asserts supremacy over the collective of suffering, and adheres to our proposed 
paradigm. In this case, however, the institution responsible for the misery extends beyond 
Godzilla himself, to include those responsible for his creation and those likely to ignite 
another calamity. Serizawa’s reluctance to use – or even unveil – the oxygen destroyer is 
indicative of this, as he believes it would be weaponized and used in the same manner as 
the H-bombs that created Godzilla. It is Serizawa’s belief that this should be the only 
time the oxygen destroyer is ever used, causing him to burn his research and commit 
suicide after confirming Godzilla’s death. In this way, he ensures that, after the current 
catastrophe is dealt with, Japan would return to a time without the oxygen destroyer, 
giving the future a better chance without this destructive technology. This is echoed by 
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Dr. Yamane’s exhortation; “Godzilla is not necessarily the last one. If H-bombs should 
continue to be used, similar monsters might appear,” and completes our requisite criteria 
(Ikeda, 48). 
 Although we are attempting to apply the same label to multiple cinemas in 
reaction to crisis, it is important to labor under the consensus that they will never be 
entirely congruent. The crises that spurred these cinematic discourses arose in different 
contexts and were approached by viewers in different manners; this is what makes them 
unique enough to warrant juxtaposition. For example, while Allbritton’s arguments – and 
our subsequent analysis of a film that emblemizes them – state that financial instability 
constitutes the vulnerability that crises feed on, not all suffering protagonists owe their 
plights to socioeconomic downturn. In Hong Kong – and specifically John Woo’s – case, 
the suffering protagonist is created by the humanized threat to cultural stability and 
longevity. For Japan, as defined by the Godzilla series, the suffering protagonist is a 
result of the dire circumstances thrust upon society by humanity’s obstinance. As for the 
necessity of a collective to share this suffering, each iteration of crisis cinema has offered 
unique takes. While Spanish crisis cinema – as with the example of the reporters and 
medical team in La chipsa de la vida – has the collective rally around the suffering 
protagonist to damn the powers that be, Hard Boiled exemplifies Hong Kong crisis 
cinema’s reliance on heroics of a select few to save the collective from ruination. 
Moreover, the Godzilla franchise evinces the significance of multilayered collectives – 
the smaller collective that struggles with the would-be catastrophic oxygen destroyer 
while remaining a part of the collective that continues to suffer at the hands of a monster. 
The antagonistic forces that exert destructive power over these collectives are also unique 
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to each brand of crisis cinema, ranging from nefarious narcissism to apocalyptic 
decimation. And while each subset analyzed here has relied on some degree of adherence 
to tradition and the past, the magnitude to which the future should be defined by them is 
protean. Heterogeneous dissimilitude notwithstanding, these are all indispensable 
elements that are found across the board, which give form to our defined phenomenon, in 
the exact way that we have defined. This form, then, this “crisis cinema” is an explicated 
paradigm that we – as film scholars – may use to heighten our apprehension of cinema’s 
pivotal role in crisis, disaster, and trauma discourses.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CRISIS CINEMA OF 3/11
 Crisis cinema, as we have defined it, relies heavily on the efficacy of mediation, 
or, more specifically, fictional narrative films and their ability to “seep into the public 
consciousness” through “widely circulating blogs, internet sites, television entertainment 
channels, journals, and newspapers” (Kaplan, 27). These films, then, create a “’group 
mind’” not through “pronouncements by prominent officials,” but through “various 
media and minority discourses produced by small collectives” that fabricate a “national 
public discourse” (Kaplan, 26). In the case of the trauma process that follows disasters, 
which we’ve defined as socially constructed, the “transmission of affect takes place as 
readily between viewer and cinematic emotions as between individuals in life,” 
“stimulat[ing] the brain [and] chang[ing] how we act” (Kaplan, 27). Crisis cinema, 
therefore, enables victims to “work over and through [their] traumatic past by recalling, 
re-enacting, bearing witness to and critiquing” their experience, and permits those that 
“have not been directly affected by the extreme events in question” to “fathom ‘the 
trauma of others’” (Stahl, 163). Indeed, the aforementioned propagation through media – 
and explicitly through “fictions” – enables “a group that has suffered a traumatic event” 
to “recognize the event’s meanings” when “it learns about another catastrophe” (Kaplan, 
27). Thus, the traumatized – being those that experience the repetitious revenant of their 
“brush with death” – are able to take “constructive symbolic steps toward working over 
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and working through [their] burdened past,” by means of a mediated homolog of their 
lived experience (Stahl, 177). This moment of “Jetztzeit,” or the “instant in which an 
image of the past sparks a flash of unexpected recognition in the present,” is a moment of 
pure allegory (Lowenstein, 149). Crisis cinema, consequently, relies on fictions, as 
“direct archival footage” cannot maintain or convey “historical specificity,” and, 
moreover, it cannot contribute to the process of healing (Caruth, 27). 
 As fictitious cinematic reactions to Japan’s 3/11 go, none is more overt than 
Hideaki Anno’s Shin Gojira, 2016. I argue, however, that this film is not representative 
of the crisis cinema that followed the disaster, instead existing “in a kind of limbo,” 
“possess[ing] no logical progression from past to future, or from social problem to 
sanctioned solution” (Combs, 21). The film, having become parodic and filled with the 
“organizational [and] political bullshit” that removes the “possibility of knowing how 
things truly are,” is a manifestation of the fatalistic defeatism that accompanies a 
“dystopian consciousness,” thereby undermining the redemptive vocation emblematic of 
crisis cinema discourse (Combs, 26). Because of this, it is necessary to define the 
elements considered “core” to the crisis cinema spawned by 3/11, scrupulously 
examining their inception into Japanese cinema, as well as the relationship they share 
with our crisis cinema paradigm. 
 Hayao Miyazaki, often considered “Japan’s greatest animation director,” is 
credited with producing works that deliver “cultural recovery” in the form of “quest[s] to 
rediscover and reincorporate elements of purity, self-sacrifice, endurance, and team 
spirit,” which are argued as being the “quintessentially Japanese” traits threatened by the 
“toxicity of contemporary Japanese society” (Napier, 289). This “discontinuous change” 
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– manifested in the disconnection from the past and its values – engenders the loss of 
identity – formed by memories of the past and the feeling of belonging to a place – faced 
by the characters in Miyazaki’s films (Satoshi, 24). Moreover, the director injects motifs 
that appeal to children and adults alike, coupling the “melding of two worlds: the real and 
the imaginary” – analogous of magic realism – with the complex elements of 
postmodernism that “address issues deeply ingrained in the social fabric of contemporary 
Japan” (McDonald, 178). This marriage of modes, “a legitimately new phenomenon” in 
Japanese filmmaking, “narrativize[s] a series of structural antimonies” that confront the 
contemporary condition (Bingham, 124). For example, the dichotomy between rural and 
urban is explored through “a lovely human harmony engrained in rural communities now 
rapidly disappearing” (McDonald, 180). This is, of course, indicative of those oldest 
Japanese filmic paradigms – being themselves an extension of nationalist ideology – such 
as “the individual and his problems [being] continually sacrificed to the well-being of 
society,” “justice and the well-being of society depend[ing] on the maintenance of 
established ways,” and the ability to “escape the pressures of their own society by 
retreat[ing] into nature” (Anderson, 322). In Miyazaki’s case, “a painstakingly evocative 
naturalistic setting with free play of fantasy” is made “possible with anime,” “whose 
readily accessible entertainment value made the message more accessible to general 
audiences” (McDonald, 179). 
 Much like the works of Miyazaki, the crisis cinema that followed 3/11 – which 
we are laboring to expound – relies on fiction’s seminal role in the previously described 
trauma process, as well as anime’s salient nature, whereby it “represents Japanese 
filmmaking as a whole,” and “accounts for half of all Japanese movie tickets sold” 
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(Richie, 257). The adulation of animation, then, comes from its “stylistic unity, or a 
controlled stylization missing from representational styles,” which results in its being 
“unified in vision, singular in style, and subject to none of the vagaries of actuality” 
(Richie, 252). It is through this intricate malleability that narratives have been – and will 
continue to be – disseminated in response to 3/11, relying on the re-intensification of the 
elements that Miyazaki championed to reignite nationalist discourse in the face of 
impending doom. Thus, the use of elements of postmodernism – the dichotomy between 
rural and urban, the catastrophic, and the misfit savior – and magic realism – the 
mysticality of nature, magical or fantastical powers, and the blurring of space and time – 
in animated films following 3/11 has constituted a new wave of crisis cinema that 
problematizes the continued pursuit of nuclear energy, thereby buttressing the national 
calls for change. 
According to our – now established – paradigm for crisis cinema, the films that 
we hope to group under the moniker must exhibit a suffering protagonist, the creation of 
a collective around said protagonist, an authoritative force of ill-reckoning that must be 
confronted by the collective, and the building of a prosperous future upon a foundation of 
the idealized past. I argue that the aforementioned elements of postmodernism and magic 
realism help with this, and are, therefore, the key elements to the wave. First, the 
inception of a suffering protagonist manifests in several ways, with the most common 
being postmodern angst in the form of an identity crisis. This utilizes the dichotomy 
between rural and urban, usually depicted as characters in a rural setting wishing for city 
life and characters from urban settings being thrust into a rural environment – or vice 
versa. The sense of not belonging, as with Miyazaki’s films, engenders suffering by 
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threatening the character’s ontological worth. Furthermore, the suffering of characters 
can be either created or compounded by another element of postmodernism, the dejection 
caused by the catastrophic. Apocalyptic despondence also commonly leads to the creation 
of collectives – our second requirement for crisis cinema – as those that suffer look for 
aid. Interestingly, collectives could form prior to or after a calamity, usually as a result of 
communities that further exacerbate the chasm between rural and urban, which affects the 
overall response to the disaster. 
The catastrophes that shake established communities often reveal, heighten, or 
abate elements of magic realism – such as magical or fantastical powers and the blurring 
of space and time – which then weigh on the validity of the perceived collectives. This, 
consequently, has the power to shatter previously infallible bonds, as well as forge 
stauncher ones. In the former, antagonism and hostility can ensue, cast by the insecurities 
of the stagnant, which often takes the form of inimical authorities that feel their dominion 
waver. Thus, dissension springs forth, worsening the already desperate situation, as our 
crisis cinema model suggests. Alternatively, the forging of new bonds can lead to 
redemption, as it enables characters to transcend previously established barriers to save 
the afflicted. This plays out commonly with the salvific outsider, who, originally 
distressed by their lack of belonging, puts the well-being of society above their own 
aspiration. The deliverance offered by these misfit paragons promises a return to the non-
cataclysmic, allowing the future to be built on faithful motifs. Moreover, the elements of 
postmodernism and magical realism present in these films – chiefly the outsider turned 
hero, disparity between rural and urban, and the mysticality of nature – serve to re-instill 
“quintessentially Japanese” motifs to disaster discourse, thereby breathing life into 
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nationalist ideology. To prove this model, it will be applied to several original – written 
and produced after 3/11 – animated films, each of which, I argue, holds a place in crisis 
cinema discourse. 
Yasuhiro Yoshiura’s Sakasama no Patema (Patema Inverted) debuted in Japan on 
November 9, 2013, making it the film most adjacent to 3/11 in this study. Perhaps 
causally, it centers on post-disaster society and the “carrying on” that occurs therein, with 
opening shots of the film featuring the cataclysmic destruction of humanity in the year 
2067. Scientists, hoping to generate energy through gravity, executed an experiment that 
inadvertently reversed Earth’s gravity, sentencing millions to their deaths and destroying 
much of humanity’s infrastructure. We are then – some years later – introduced to 
Patema, a prominent member of an underground society, who, being bored with the 
confined tunnels and shafts of this refuge, habitually disregards the rules and explores the 
“Danger Zone.” Already, Patema’s discontent symbolizes a suffering protagonist, as her 
freewill is restricted by the sins of her forefathers. Along with this, it is revealed that a 
man called Lagos, the closest thing Patema had to family, left the colony years before, 
with no contact between the two taking place in the years since. Thus, Patema is afflicted 
by an identity crisis, feeling as though she is not where she belongs, which manifests in 
her desire to explore. 
Shortly after we are introduced to Patema, along with some members of her 
society, we accompany her on another excursion into the Danger Zone. This time, 
however, things take a turn for the worse when she is confronted by an otherworldly 
figure with red, glowing eyes and garbed in a black cloak, who is seemingly hanging 
from the ceiling of a tunnel. Patema, who refers to the figure as a “bat person,” tries to 
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defend herself, before ultimately falling down the large shaft underneath her catwalk. 
Upon regaining consciousness, Patema attempts to climb – seemingly – down from the 
tree that she is stuck in, but realizes that, below her, an apparently endless chasm awaits. 
Nonetheless, as her bag slips from her grasp and gets caught on a chain-link fence below 
her, she resolves to climb down to it. This leads to the introduction of our second – later 
elucidated as suffering – protagonist, Age, who, upon seeing the bag on the fence, moves 
towards it. As both characters reach the prize, it is revealed that, somehow, their gravities 
are inverted, with Age standing flat on the ground and Patema in danger of falling into 
the sky. Their inverted gravity, then, is representative of magical or fantastical powers, 
which acts as the reason they are able to meet and, later, bond. The two discover that, by 
holding on to each other, they can nullify the threat posed by Patema’s plight. 
Subsequently, they travel to a nearby abandoned structure, where, once inside, Patema is 
able to stand on the ceiling without fear of “falling.” The pair spend time introducing 
themselves and interrogating each other over their worlds, but when an alarm sounds, 
Age runs off after promising to come back for Patema. This, already, constitutes the 
forming of new bonds – and therefore collectives – that, by way of magic realism, 
transcends boundaries between disparate communities. 
The focus of the film shifts to Age, along with the civilization within which he 
exists, as we are given further information on the calamity that reshaped humanity, 
labeled “The Great Change,” along with a look into Age’s life in this “surface society.” 
Depicted as an aging, monotonous totalitarianism, the society – Aiga – drills into its 
populace the difference between themselves – “the true humanity” – and the “sinners” 
that “fell into the sky,” while constantly reiterating the need to “follow the laws, maintain 
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order, and watch the ground.” Age, whose actions and inclination cause him to stand out 
from Aiga’s dull, grey uniformity, is a clear misfit in the society, establishing his role as 
suffering protagonist through, much the same as Patema, an identity crisis. This is 
compounded as, after returning to Patema and spending time with her, the two are hunted 
by the “security police” – Patema’s “bat people” – sent by Izamura – Aiga’s domineering 
leader – who despises “inverts” like Patema. These events, juxtaposed with scenes of 
Patema’s friends – notably a boy named Porta – planning to rescue her, establish the two 
major communities in the film. Aiga, representing an “urban” setting and community, 
and Patema’s underground society, which symbolizes a more “rural” coterie – with their 
differences allegorically displayed by their seeing the world inverted from one another. 
Furthermore, it substantiates the antagonistic institution responsible – at least in part – for 
the suffering of our protagonists, which betokens a further divide between the 
communities. Eventually, Patema and Age are caught by the security police, both 
becoming subject to the powers that be – Age is physically, and psychologically, 
assaulted, while Patema is held captive by Izamura – setting the stage for an inevitable 
clash with this hegemony of hostility. While under the control of Izamura, Patema is told 
the “truth” of The Great Change, which includes Izamura’s insistence that Patema, along 
with all other “inverts,” are scum and sinners. It is then revealed that Lagos, who was 
also being held prisoner by Izamura, has died, adding to Patema’s suffering. Additionally, 
this moment in the film stands to reiterate the disparity between the communities – 
through Izamura’s prejudice – as well as the mysticality of nature that facilitates the 
groups’ inverted gravity enigma. 
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The ensuing events represent the breaking of boundaries and forming of 
collectives, as Age travels with Porta back to the underground society to plot Patema’s 
rescue, with the final plan requiring commitment from both Age – a member of the 
surface “urban” community – and Porta – a member of the underground “rural” 
community. The two work together to sneak through Aiga’s defenses, and, before long, 
Age is able to come to Patema’s rescue – Porta is held back by his inverted gravity, 
which makes it too risky for him to follow. While Patema and Age are sharing a moment, 
Izamura springs his trap, surrounding the two with his security police, and consequently 
stoking the flames of dissension. The standoff eventually proceeds to the roof, where, at 
gunpoint, Patema and Age are able to escape by ascending into the sky – Patema’s 
gravity is now stronger than Age’s, because she has a device strapped to her leg that 
experiences gravitational pull in the same direction as her – which represents the 
utilization of their magical or fantastical powers. The pair, after losing and subsequently 
regaining consciousness, fly ever closer to the stars, before ultimately realizing that the 
stars – and the sky itself – are a mechanical construction suspended over Aiga, blurring 
the previously defined space of the film. To their amazement, they discover Patema’s bag 
that had “fallen” into the sky, which leads them to discover the flying machine that Age’s 
father had built – a topic they discussed earlier in the film – and, as a result, the journal 
inside. The journal, belonging to Age’s father, recounts his friendship with Lagos – 
another example of collective-building across boundaries – with whom he built the flying 
machine. Patema and Age, whose bond has been strengthened by this ordeal, use the 
machine to travel back to Aiga, where the final confrontation with Izamura – and Aiga 
itself – occurs. A chase ensues that leads everyone to the underground society, where 
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Izamura’s plans are foiled and the truth is revealed. Aiga, along with the underground 
society, exist below Earth’s real surface, with the citizens of Aiga being the real 
“inverts,” that hid underground to survive Earth’s inverted gravity. The underground 
society, then, – Patema’s people – were the people whose gravity was not affected by The 
Great Change, and who decided to live underground to help the afflicted. Upon 
discovering this, Patema, Age, and the others resolve to start anew on Earth’s surface, 
living harmoniously and washing away the pains caused by the disaster and, importantly, 
Izamura and Aiga. Thus, humanity is redeemed by the unlikely collective of two 
disparate groups, led by suffering outsiders – and made possible by fantastical powers 
granted by nature’s mysticality – that, together, overthrew the great oppressor. 
In 2016, Makoto Shinkai’s Kimi no Na wa exploded onto the scene, becoming the 
highest grossing Japanese film of all time with a record gross of $359 million. Shinkai’s 
work masterfully blends elements of postmodernism and magic realism into a coming of 
age story that tackles motifs related to 3/11, with a large emphasis being put on the 
inevitability of disaster and humanity’s need to cooperate in times of crisis. The film 
opens on Mitsuha Miyamizu, a high school student living in a rural Japanese town, 
Itomori, with her grandmother and younger sister. As Mitsuha goes about her morning 
routine, people comment on her “unusual behavior” from the day before, which she has 
no recollection of. While walking to school with her friends, Sayaka and Katsuhiko – 
nicknamed “Tessie” – they come across Mitsuha’s father, the incumbent mayor of 
Itomori, campaigning for reelection. The mayor reprimands Mitsuha in front of her 
classmates – yelling at her to “stand up straight” – causing her to be embarrassed. Sayaka 
and Tessie’s warmth towards Mitsuha when she is distressed, along with her relationship 
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with her sister and grandmother, begin to delineate the collectives surrounding her, which 
become key later in the film. After discovering someone else’s writing in her notebook, 
Mitsuha confronts Sayaka and Tessie, who continue to describe her odd doings of the day 
prior. Mistuha admits that she feels as though she’s been living in a dream about someone 
else’s life, however, she attributes this to her gloom felt by living in such a small, rural 
town, stating that she wants to graduate and move to Tokyo. This helps to evince 
Mitsuha’s identity crisis, which results from her feeling as though she is not where she 
belongs. Thus, Mitsuha is a suffering protagonist being acted upon by the structural 
antimony constructed through the contention between rural and urban. Compounding 
this, Mitsuha’s family is in charge of the Miyamizu Shrine, which sees her taking part in 
traditional rituals in front of everyone – something that she finds embarrassing and adds 
to her list of reasons for wanting to leave. 
 The story shifts to focus on high school Tokyoite, Taki Tachibana, whose life we 
follow for two consecutive days. On the first day, Taki seems at odds with his own life, 
getting confused over mundane rituals and being captivated by daily scenery. His friends 
notice – and comment on – his strange behavior, which seems to affect everything he 
does, culminating in his need to ask where his own job is. At work, he struggles to keep 
up, makes numerous mistakes, and even causes a scene with a rude customer. He is 
bailed out by his coworker, Ms. Okudera, whose skirt is slashed intentionally by the 
customer. Taki, still seemingly out of character, mends Okudera’s skirt out of gratitude, 
to which she states her approval of his “feminine side.” At home that night, Taki, 
referring to his own belongings in third person, leaves a note in his journal describing the 
days activities. For a brief second, we see Mitsuha’s notebook with the stranger’s note; 
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“Who are you?” which prompts Taki to write “Mitsuha” on his hand before falling 
asleep. This entire first day, then, was – through the use of magic realism – Mitsuha’s 
dream of living in Tokyo come true, as she spent the day “body-swapped” with a boy 
from Tokyo. The second day – taking much less time on screen – sees Taki react to 
everything that signifies the odd occurrences of the previous day, such as the writing on 
his hand, the journal entry, and his friends’ snarky comments. Focus then shifts rapidly 
between Mitsuha, Taki, Mitsuha in Taki’s body, and Taki in Mitsuha’s body, before the 
two realize, simultaneously, that they have been switching places randomly while 
sleeping. Mitsuha and Taki begin to communicate through notes on their phones, paper, 
and even bodies, whereby they develop rules for when the switching happens. These 
rules, meant to make the process more bearable, consist of “do’s and don’ts,” as well as 
things to watch out for. They also decide to leave reports for the days that they switch, 
which will allow further clarity. As the switching continues, however, they both do things 
that irritate the other, and they both complain about each other’s lives. This whole series 
of events is emblematic of the aforementioned dichotomy between rural and urban – the 
lives of two teenagers from each side overlapping – along with magical or fantastical 
powers that blur our – and the characters’ – understanding of space and time. 
As the rush surrounding the discovery of the body-swapping phenomenon dies 
down, we are placed with Taki – in Mitsuha’s body – for a day. Significant coverage is 
being given in the news to the comet, Tiamat, which is described as having an orbital 
period of 1,200 years, and that can now be seen with the naked eye. Mitsuha – but really 
Taki – accompanies her grandmother and sister to the sacred vessel of the local deity, 
where they will deliver an offering of kuchikamizake – sake made by Mitsuha in a ritual 
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previously, where rice is chewed into a mash that is spit into a container and left to 
ferment – which Mitsuha’s grandmother denotes as “half of Mitsuha.” On the journey 
home, Mitsuha’s grandmother confronts her, claiming “you’re dreaming already, aren’t 
you?” Taki immediately wakes up – in his own body – before realizing that Mitsuha has 
set up a date between himself and Ms. Okudera. After he becomes distracted by 
photographs on the wall – which are of Itomori – Okudera infers that Taki is “like a 
different person, today,” and the date eventually ends when she confronts him about his 
feelings. Now on his own, Taki looks through Mitsuha’s notes on his phone, finding one 
that references the comet. Not knowing what she means, he decides to call her phone. 
This is interjected with Tessie calling to check on Mitsuha, who, feeling dejected because 
of Taki’s date with Okudera, decided not to go to the festival and see the comet with her 
friends. Following this phone call, however, Mitsuha decides to join Sayaka and Tessie 
after all, showing up with a much shorter hair cut – one of Mitsuha’s defining physical 
traits in the film has been her hair, which she always wears in a specific style with a red 
braided cord. The audience was made aware of Taki’s presence in Mitsuha’s body, as he 
wore her hair down or in a ponytail. This represents a further complication with 
Mitsuha’s identity crisis, as she does not understand the feelings that she is having in 
reaction to Taki’s date. The three go to see the comet together, and, after taking in its 
beauty for a brief moment, it splits in two pieces, one of which heads towards Earth. 
Taki’s call to Mitsuha is unsuccessful, as he is met with a recorded message 
indicating that the phone is either out of range or turned off. He resolves to tell her about 
the date the next time the switch, however, the switching ceases. Taki becomes obsessed 
with Itomori – though he does not know its name – and begins to draw it from memory, 
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search for it in reference books, as well as study the mountains he assumes surround it. 
This progression, which also includes his daydreaming through daily activities, represents 
Taki’s suffering. Unlike Mitsuha, who was suffering due to dissatisfaction with her own 
life, Taki is now suffering because of the loss of their connection, which culminates in his 
leaving Tokyo to attempt to find Itomori himself. To his surprise, Tsukasa – one of his 
friends from school who he told to cover for him – and Ms. Okudera are waiting for him 
as he arrives at the train station, who both believe that he is going to meet an online 
friend. This establishes a supportive collective around Taki during his time of 
despondency and helps to encourage his journey for answers that might offer salvation. 
While the trio is eating at a restaurant during the trip, the restaurant’s chef – who 
is originally from Itomori – notices Taki’s drawings, confirming the town’s name and 
reinvigorating Taki, however, the others immediately recognize it as a town that was 
obliterated by a comet 3 years prior. The chef takes them to the site of the disaster, and, 
as he takes in the ruination, Taki discovers that the messages left on his phone by 
Mitsuha are beginning to fade. The blurring of space and time is intensified, increasing 
Taki’s dismay. Together at a library, Tsukasa and Okudera try to explain the events of 
Itomori’s demise to Taki, who subsequently finds Mitsuha’s name amongst the dead. 
Later on, while the three renting a room, Taki struggles to understand what has happened, 
even coming to realize that he has forgotten Mitsuha’s name. Okudera, while looking at a 
book about Itomori’s braided cords, notices the one that Taki wears on his wrist. When 
she asks him about it, he says that someone gave it to him a long time ago, but he cannot 
recall who. He then explains how someone – Mitsuha’s grandmother, who, along with 
Mitsuha and her sister, made the braided cords at their shrine – explained to him – while 
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he was in Mitsuha’s body – that the threads represent time itself, twisting, tangling, 
unraveling, and connecting again. Remembering this causes Taki to recall the sacred 
vessel that he visited with Mitsuha’s family, and, while Tsukasa and Okudera are 
sleeping, he hears Mitsuha’s voice and resolves to visit the vessel alone. 
The chef from Itomori, feeling sentimental about the drawing, gives Taki a ride to 
the area surrounding the disaster zone along with food for his journey. Taki then sets off, 
retracing his steps in search of the vessel, remembering everything Mitsuha’s 
grandmother taught him about their traditions, until he eventually finds its location. Upon 
entering the vessel, he finds Mitsuha’s kuchikamizake, which he consumes in the hopes 
that it would reconnect them. Taki, after drinking the sake, slips, revealing a drawing of 
the comet on the cave’s wall, which prompts a series of visions, or flashbacks, of 
Mitsuha’s life, from birth to the comet’s arrival. He then wakes with a start, realizing that 
he is back in Mitsuha’s body on the day that she dies. Mistuha’s grandmother, who 
instantly discerns that it is Taki, explains how she also experienced body-swapping when 
she was young, a phenomenon experienced by generations of the Miyamizu family. Taki 
informs her of the impending disaster and, after resolving to save everyone, runs off to 
find Sayaka and Tessie. While trying to convince them of the danger, they discover that 
the lake near Itomori was created by a meteor that broke off of the comet during its last 
orbit, 1,200 years prior. Next, Taki attempts to convince the mayor – Mitsuha’s father – 
to evacuate the town, however, he does not believe the story about the meteor, and, after 
hearing the mayor insult his own daughter, Taki lashes out. The mayor in this instance 
represents an oppressive force that, by use of its power over others, causes harm to others 
– by not taking the threat serious, he is endangering the lives of everyone in Itomori. 
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Since the mayor is unwilling to help, Taki decides to go to the vessel, in Mitsuha’s body, 
but instructs Sayaka, Tessie, and Mitsuha’s sister to continue the plan they had 
constructed previously. 
Mitsuha wakes up in Taki’s body where he was last, inside the vessel before the 
swap, and discovers the ruins of Itomori. A flashback ensues – from Taki’s perspective as 
he rushes to the vessel in Mitsuha’s body – showing Mitsuha’s trip to Tokyo a day before 
the disaster, expressing her desire to meet Taki before his date with Okudera, however, 
being three years into Taki’s past, he has no memory of her. Before they are separated by 
the bustling crowd at a train station, Mitsuha tells him her name and gives him the 
braided cord that she always wears. Back at the vessel, the two are both present and can 
hear each other, but are unable to see each other, being separated by three years. They 
eventually cross paths and, at twilight – considered “magic hour” in the local tradition – 
switch back into their own bodies. The two, able to see each other in person for the first 
time, discuss the plans for saving Itomori, agreeing to write their names on each other’s 
hands, which will act as a reminder when they wake up. Taki is able to write his, but 
before Mitsuha is able to, their timelines split. Taki, now in his own time again, forgets 
Mitsuha’s name, once again causing his suffering. Mitsuha, running back to Itomori, 
meets up with Tessie, who, along with Sayaka, begin the plan to save the citizens. They 
set off an explosion and, using the high school intercom, broadcast a warning to the 
citizens, mandating their immediate evacuation to the high school – which lies outside of 
the meteor’s zone of destruction – to avoid the forest fire started by their explosives. 
Tessie, realizing that their evacuation plans will not be able to save everyone, tells 
Mitsuha that she must confront her father, thereby gaining his help to evacuate the entire 
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town. As she is running, exhausted, to the Town Hall, Mitsuha struggles with forgetting 
Taki’s name and, upon falling, opens her hand to find that he wrote “I love you.” This 
empowers her, strengthening her resolve to reach town hall.  
Taki wakes up near the vessel again, this time with absolutely no memory of why 
he is there. Five years later, Taki, now a college graduate seeking employment, feels as 
though he is missing something, which consumes his every thought – indeed, he is even 
searching for a job that allows him to help plan landscapes, so as to better prepare for 
impending disasters. It is revealed that the evacuation efforts were successful, with no 
deaths occurring from the meteor, and, out at a café, Taki overhears Tessie and Sayaka 
discussing their wedding. Hearing their names stirs something within him, combined by 
his constantly seeing a woman wearing a braided cord, and he begins to become focused 
on the disaster again. Later, Mitsuha and Taki come face to face in the windows of 
passing trains, causing them both to feel like they are close to discovering what they’ve 
been missing. As such, they begin running around the city until, eventually, they find 
each other, reestablishing their connection and ending their suffering. 
Masaaki Yuasa’s Yoaketsugeru Ru no Uta (Lu over the Wall) was originally 
released in May 2017, a full 6 years after the events of 3/11. The film, which the director 
admits as being accessible to children, focuses on the overcoming of prejudices, the 
dichotomy between human greed and nature, and the prevention of disaster through 
cooperation. Set in Hinashi Town, a small, rural fishing village, the film centers on Kai 
Ashimoto, a middle school student that left Tokyo to live with his father and grandfather. 
Kai, feeling dejected because of his boring life in the small village, uses music as a form 
of escapism, and does not socialize with the other students. Being an outsider, Kai’s 
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despondency is indicative of an identity crisis, as he feels out of place in the rural village 
that is constantly contrasted with Tokyo. Thus, we have a suffering protagonist made real 
by the structural antimony of rural vs urban, which removes the sense of belonging 
required to form one’s identity. 
On his way to school, after a rushed breakfast with his father and grandfather, Kai 
is approached by Yuho and Kunio, two classmates that formed a band, SEIREN, 
together. Yuho and Kunio both treat Kai as a friend, and, after seeing his music posted 
online, want him to join their band. Their supportive nature and insistence on being Kai’s 
friend – despite him giving them the cold shoulder – is representative of a collective 
assembling around the suffering protagonist, which is completed when, after learning that 
they practice on Merfolk Island – an area steeped in myths surrounding mermaids – Kai 
agrees to practice with them. This ensues after Kai, alone in his grandfather’s boathouse, 
sees something mysterious in the water and becomes captivated by mermaid lore. As the 
three begin to play music together, a strange voice is heard singing along, which Kai goes 
to investigate alone. Upon finding the source, Kai, who is unable to stop dancing, 
discovers that it is a mermaid causing the sounds, which then disappears when the music 
stops. Deciding not to tell the others, Kai rejoins Yuho and Kunio as they depart to go 
home, however, they witness poachers illegally fishing near Merfolk Island, who, upon 
noticing the band’s presence, rush over to confront them. The poachers, wanting to 
intimidate the group, threaten them with physical violence – going as far as throwing 
Kai’s phone into the water – before being thrown into the water themselves – a 
mysterious pillar of water erupts from the ocean, overturning the poachers’ vessel. The 
incident, which further solidifies the bond between the three, is denotive of the 
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mysticality of nature and magical or fantastical powers that will come to define much of 
the narrative. 
When he returns home, Kai begins to ask his grandfather – who has lived in the 
village his entire life and harbors a great mistrust of mermaids – questions about the 
mythical creatures, before his father reveals that he knows Kai traveled to Merfolk Island. 
Kai’s grandfather, who has repeatedly warned Kai to stay away from there, becomes 
angry, causing Kai to leave dinner early and seek refuge in the empty boathouse. 
Throughout the majority of the film, Kai does not see eye to eye with authority figures – 
even his family – which often leads to dissension. While listening to music alone in the 
boathouse, Kai, once again, notices the mysterious figure in the water, which turns out to 
be a mermaid. The creature, able to control water, floods the boathouse in pursuit of Kai, 
who, by accident, discovers that music causes the mermaid to begin dancing as legs 
replace its tail. The mermaid, who introduces herself as Lu, ensures Kai that she does not 
wish to eat him, returning his phone instead and disappearing back into the water. Lu is 
emblematic of many crisis cinema attributes; her existence as a mermaid, while 
representing the mysticality of nature and granting her fantastical powers, casts her as an 
outsider and leads to her suffering later in the film. Along with this, the close friendship 
that she develops with Kai symbolizes the forming of a collective across boundaries, 
specifically those evocative of “rural” and “urban,” as, even though Hinashi Town is a 
rural village, Lu represents nature itself. 
Lu and Kai begin to spend time together, which, along with making the two grow 
closer, seemingly cures Kai of his melancholy, leading to him interacting more with 
friends and family. This culminates when Kai introduces Yuho and Kunio to Lu, thereby 
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amalgamating their collectives and creating a larger one. The band, now including Lu, is 
offered – and accepts – to play at the local Lantern Festival, organized by Yuho’s father 
and grandfather – both prominent members of Hinashi Town’s governance. In order to 
keep Lu a secret and keep her out of the sun – which is harmful to mermaids – but still 
allow her to sing, they hide her in an icebox cooler with a microphone. This plan, 
however, falls through when Lu, whose singing causes everyone to dance uncontrollably, 
joins in, thereby revealing herself to the people of Hinashi Town. Kai and Kunio take 
advantage of the crowd’s dumfounded-ness, rushing Lu to the water, which allows her to 
escape. When news of mermaids’ existence spreads – helped by internet videos showing 
Lu dancing – the members of Hinashi Town’s officialdom – including Yuho’s father and 
grandfather – try to pressure information out of the trio, hoping to “put Hinashi Town 
back on the map.” We learn that several of the older citizens of the village – including 
Kai’s grandfather – hold grudges against mermaids, who they believe killed their loved 
ones in the past. That notwithstanding, the overwhelming consensus is to reopen the 
theme park on Merfolk Island, using the band – and Lu – as the main attraction. This 
decision consists of many different motives, with Yuho and Kunio wanting the exposure 
for the band, Lu’s desire to befriend more humans, and Yuho’s grandfather’s wishes to 
reopen his previously failed theme park. Kai, who believes Lu would be endangered by 
this plan, does not wish to go along with it and, therefore, returns to his original state of 
despondency – even ignoring Lu after she agrees to go ahead with the plan. 
As the event at Merfolk Land – the newly re-opened theme park – begins, Yuho 
and Kunio, who discover that they’ve been replaced by professional musicians made to 
look like them, run into Kai, who being upset by the reckless treatment of Lu, starts a 
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quarrel with the two, causing Yuho to run away. Once Lu begins to panic at the discovery 
of her friends’ replacement, compounded by her being treated as a spectacle, she lashes 
out violently and disappears. Yuho’s father, believing that Lu has kidnapped Yuho – 
along with being pressured by fishermen – captures Lu in a cage and threatens to expose 
her to the sun. This causes Lu’s “papa,” a colossal sea monster, to rush to her aid, 
however, he too is captured by Yuho’s father. This finalizes the construction of an 
oppressive, hegemonic force, as Yuho’s father’s wealth and position allow him to inflict 
suffering onto other characters. The events that have ensued – the forceful kidnapping of 
a mermaid that is then made to suffer – are reminiscent of those in the town’s folklore, 
and, as pointed out by the local shrine priest, the signs of a repeat disaster – green, 
magical water flooding the town – begin to show themselves. Kai, Yuho, and Kunio, with 
the help of Kai’s father and Yuho’s grandfather, are able to free Lu and her father, 
thereby confronting and, subsequently, overcoming the draconian source of malaise. The 
threat of the flood, however, still looms, causing the group to begin the rush to evacuate 
the village. When it appears that evacuation efforts will not be good enough, a profusion 
of mermaids appear and begin helping. The mermaids, determined to stop the large tidal 
wave, attempt to use their powers, however, the sun begins to rise, endangering them and 
impeding their efforts. The people of Hinashi Town, including those that held grudges 
against the mermaids – after having found out that their loved ones were bit, and 
subsequently turn into mermaids, in order to save them – rally together and, by using 
umbrellas to block the sun, protect the mermaids, thereby allowing the disaster to be 
averted. This final collective building, then, the bringing together of individuals from 
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disparate groups, saves the village – by way of magical or fantastical powers – and 
prevents further suffering by holding nature in reverence. 
The films analyzed here, I argue, are representative of both crisis cinema 
discourse and the filmic mediation that followed Japan’s 3/11. Moreover, these films 
accomplish this, specifically, by utilizing key elements of postmodernism and magic 
realism to offer an avenue for those affected by the disaster to heal, as well as an opening 
for nationalist ideas that are meant to cure Japan’s current identity crisis. The dichotomy 
between rural and urban cropped up, in some way, in each of these films, being used to 
establish identity crises that lead to characters’ suffering, as well as to create defined, 
disparate communities. For example, the underground society in Sakasama no Patema 
represents a rural community, in this case free from the totalitarianism of Aiga, which 
represents the urban community. These communities lead to the suffering of protagonists, 
with Patema wishing to escape the mundaneness of rural life, and Age wanting to be free 
of the oppressive state. This pattern is similarly found in Kimi no Na wa, where rural 
life’s humdrum causes Mitsuha to question her very identity. Furthermore, the tightknit 
nature of the rural community of Itomori is what allows death to be avoided entirely. As 
for Yoaketsugeru Ru no Uta, Kai suffers from a near-homogenous affliction to Mitsuha’s, 
and Hinashi Town is, in many ways, Itomori’s sister. This element is an axiomatic 
allusion to the disparate nature of the communities affected by 3/11. The rural, coastal 
zones devastated by, in some cases, a triple attack found themselves differentiated – 
sometimes palpable due to the fear of radiation – from those in the inland, urban centers. 
That notwithstanding, Japanese people embraced their national spirits, stepping across 
these geographical boundaries to stand together in solidarity. 
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Additionally, each film analyzed relies on a catastrophe to create suffering, 
boundaries, and subsequent salvation through unanimity. For Sakasama no Patema, the 
disaster was an anthropogenic affront on mother nature occurring in the past, thereby 
forcing the protagonists to recover and “carry on.” This is emblematic of the immediate 
state of recovery following 3/11, where national calls for solidarity and perseverance 
filled the public sphere, and voices of disquietude pointed to the human involvement of 
the disaster. In Kimi no Na wa, the predicted, credible threat of a disaster is heeded, 
removing the danger posed to hundreds of innocent civilians. Perhaps as wish fulfillment, 
this finds itself closely aligned with the threat of a possible repeat to a millennium-old 
earthquake and tsunami that were ignored by Japan’s energy officials. The cataclysm in 
Yoaketsugeru Ru no Uta, while ultimately avoided, betokens the unpredictable essence of 
natural disasters, washing away whatever plans humanity had to begin with. Each film, 
too, features the crossing of boundaries by perceived “outsiders,” without whom the 
destruction would be exponential. In Sakasama no Patema, the efforts of Patema and 
Age, outsiders bouncing between communities, are what made it possible for humanity to 
shake off the yolk of a tyrannical hegemony. Without the experience of becoming 
outsiders in the bodies of others, Taki and Mitsuha would not have saved Itomori in Kimi 
no Na wa. Likewise, Yoaketsugeru Ru no Uta’s Lu, an outsider to human culture, was 
paramount to saving humanity from an insidious curse. These “salvific misfits,” then, 
represent the reliance that victims of 3/11 had on outside aid, without which the death toll 
could have been much higher. 
Finally, each film uses unique blends of magic realism’s common elements – the 
mysticality of nature, magical or fantastical powers, and the blurring of space and time – 
 
57 
ensuring that, while fictitious enough to avoid compounding the repetitive nature of 
trauma, the narratives are able to begin to offer mediated recovery. As for Sakasama no 
Patema, nature’s mockery of mankind’s attempted ascension to godhood is symbolic of 
its mysticality, which manifests itself in the form of the fantastical power of flight. 
Furthermore, the understanding of space is thrown into doubt when it is discovered that 
the sky is manufactured, and even more so when we discover Aiga’s truth. In Kimi no Na 
wa, Mitsuha and Taki’s experience is tied closely to the mystical spirituality of nature – 
as Mitsuha’s grandmother reminds us – and allows for the magical or fantastical power of 
body-swapping, which transcends normal perception of time. Yoaketsugeru Ru no Uta 
features the creation of an entire mythos surrounding nature’s mysticality, giving us the 
mermaids that, through the magical power of controlling water, eventually save the day. 
This, of course, compounded by the seemingly timelessness of their existence, blurring 
our understanding of humanity’s role in the world. These elements, then, offer healing 
and redemption by constructing motifs such as the cooperation of humanity across 
boundaries and the need to revere, not destroy, nature and tradition, each of which are 
steeped in the cultural national discourse that is used to reinforce Japanese national 
identity. 
One of the inspirations for the film was the earthquake in 2011. It was the largest 
in a thousand years, and there was something similar 1,000 years ago, which we 
all forgot about. But if you look closer there were warnings, like stone 
inscriptions in the cave in the film: don’t live in this valley. But we forgot those 
warnings or dismiss them as something from ‘ancient times.’ We think they’re 
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just dangers from the past. When we have a disaster in Japan, I wonder, how can 
we prevent our lives and traditions and history from the disaster (Shinkai, 2016).
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CRISIS CYCLE CONTINUES: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSTION
Having provided concluding thoughts in the previous section, I would like to take 
the time to posit this study’s relevance to the future. First, this work provides the 
opportunity for a more centralized discussion on a cohesive definition for crisis cinema, 
regardless of the validity of the provided paradigm. Crisis cinema discourse, as of this 
stage, is constituted by varying, disparate claims that, apart from the initiated, hardly 
convey a pattern. By composing a “master” pattern for crisis cinema, film’s mediatory 
power in the face of crisis will be more readily substantiated. This, as shown here, does 
not constrict the individual elements found in each “wave” of crisis cinema, which will 
allow for the variation required to hold scholarly debates on crises that exhibit vast 
dissimilitude. Furthermore, this study helps to provide additional proof of the link 
between film studies and trauma studies in the first place, which is key to the vitality of 
crisis cinema discourse. Finally, this paper will be beneficial when studying the patterns 
of Japanese film in the coming years, with films similar to those studied within releasing 
regularly. For example, 2019 saw the release of Hiroyuki Imaishi’s Puromea and Makoto 
Shinkai’s Tenki no Ko. The former, being the work of anime giant Studio Trigger, carries 
a plot very similar to that of Sakasama no Patema. Humanity finds itself on the ropes due 
to the never-ending modernistic pursuit of innovation, which has, once again, caused a 
tremendous calamity that engenders suffering. The latter, Shinkai’s follow-up to the 
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record-breaking Kimi no Na wa, presents identity crisis and salvific cooperation in much 
the same manner as its older sibling. Thus, crisis cinema – especially in reaction to 3/11 – 
is alive and well in Japan, giving room for future scholarship of this strain. This paper, 
then, is a steppingstone in the perennial pursuit of turning humanity’s greatest calamities 
into lessons for the future.
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